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Abstract 
This study examines the determinants of exit from academic research which occurs when 
academic researchers move into positions in academe which concentrate on non-research 
activities such as teaching or administration, or when researchers leave academia and move 
into industry. Drawing on career data for 14,000 Japanese PhD graduates in hard sciences (all 
scientific fields except social sciences and humanities), we develop a set of econometric 
models to test the determinants of exit from a career in academic research. We find that 
academics’ scientific productivity and academic network are negatively correlated with 
abandoning a university research career, and that female academics, and researchers in less-
prestigious universities, tend to exit academic research more easily. Individual and 
institutional network effects play a role mainly for senior researchers. The results indicate 
also that the determinants of exit are contingent on scientific field and career stage. 
 
Keywords 
Researcher mobility; academic career; academic labor market; exit 
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1. Introduction 
Academic research is extremely competitive, and its “up-or-out” nature inevitably results in a 
proportion of academics leaving a research career after initial involvement. Although this 
selection process is fundamental in explaining the highly skewed scientific production in 
academia (Lotka 1926), we know little about what characterizes exit from academic research. 
Most of the sociological and economic literature that analyzes science, concentrates on 
explaining success, and focuses on the performance of academic stars. However, if the 
selection mechanisms are imperfect, for example, if selection is driven by other criteria than 
merit, then the investment in human capital will be used inefficiently. Policy makers and 
scientific communities have expressed concern over these issues. Gender and ethnicity 
discrimination are examples of biased selection criteria. Wolfinger et al. (2009) indicate that 
female PhDs are disproportionately more likely to be employed as non-tenured faculty and to 
exit the paid labor force, even when controlling for academic productivity (Kaminski and 
Geisler 2012), while Ginther et al. (2011) show that US National Institute of Health (NIH) 
grants are less likely to be awarded to certain ethnicities. Such discrimination could exclude 
potential talent from continuing an academic research career after completion of the PhD, or 
expedite mobility out of an academic research career. There are other factors that also can 
discourage promising researchers from pursuing an academic research career after 
completion of their doctoral study. Donowitz et al. (2007) suggest that American physician-
scientists tend to favor lucrative practitioner careers, and are discouraged by the unstable 
system of funding for junior researchers. In addition, the number of academic positions open 
to junior researchers in the US, EU, and Japan has failed to keep pace with the numbers of 
new doctoral graduates with the result that even the most capable are opting for non-
academic research jobs (NISTEP 2009a; Stephan 2012). 
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The present study tries to shed more light on the process that induces academics to leave 
active research, by examining the determinants of academic research exit based on a sample 
of Japanese academics. We define “researcher exit” here as the case of an academic 
researcher abandoning research after some period either to take up an academic position that 
focuses on non-research activities such as teaching or administration, or to move into 
industry. There are several potential determinants of exit from an academic research career; 
we focus on individual, institutional, and geographical factors, drawing on the literature on 
academic mobility (e.g., Allison and Long 1990; Chan et al. 2002; Crespi et al. 2007), search 
theory models (e.g., Burdett 1978; Jovanovic 1979; Mortensen and Pissarides 1994), and 
policy research on academic career design (e.g., Gaughan and Robin 2004; Ginther and Kahn 
2004; Long et al. 1993). 
The prior empirical literature on academic careers is based mostly on the US and Europe. 
With the exception of some research on higher education (Arimoto 2011; Teichler et al. 2013; 
Yamanoi 2007), the Japanese academic labor market has been understudied. Our main aim in 
this chapter is to offer a comprehensive analysis of exit among Japanese academic 
researchers. We employ a sample of 14,000 PhD graduates in hard sciences (all scientific 
fields except social sciences and humanities), who obtained their doctoral degrees in the 
period 1985-1989. The data source is the Japanese National Library’s PhD degree database. 
We follow the careers of the sample graduates over 20 years (from 1990 to 2010) using the 
Japanese national research grant program, Grants-in-Aid (GiA) data. 1  Our econometric 
models suggest that the determinants of exit from an academic research career include 
scientific productivity and academic network which are negatively correlated with moving 
out of academic research, and that female researchers and researchers in less-prestigious 
universities have a higher probability of exiting from academic research. The findings suggest 
                                                 
1 GiA is the primary national research funding system in Japan. 
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that the determinants of moving from academia are contingent on scientific field and career 
stage, and that the selection process in Japan is, at least partly, based on merit but may also be 
based on gender and university prestige, resulting in the unintended exit of potentially 
talented researchers. 
 
2. Career path and exit from academic research career 
In Japan and other advanced countries, the professional career of an academic researcher 
starts after completion of postgraduate-level education (e.g., PhD degree). Some doctoral 
graduates choose to pursue an academic career and continue to do research and teaching in 
academia, others focus mainly (or only) on teaching, and some choose research or non-
research jobs in industry.  
We consider the critical points in the academic research career path as those moments where 
the probability of leaving an academic research career is higher. Exit can be regarded as a 
type of mobility toward non-academic research employment, which may occur at various 
points in an academic research career. In some countries such as France and the UK, there are 
special PhD programs that allow students financed by companies to pursue more focused 
research projects that are aligned to the firms’ interests. It is not surprising that most of these 
students continue their career in industry. If we exclude these cases, the three most important 
decision times are: (1) after PhD graduation, (2) at the time of consideration for a 
tenured/permanent position, and (3) after obtaining a permanent position. At these moments, 
academics might be tempted to leave the academic labor market as the result of a job offer 
from a company, or might decide to focus completely on teaching and/or administration and 
give up research activity. However, the probability of moving to a job in industry is small due 
to the specificities of the Japanese science market; e.g., in 2004 only 0.1% of academics 
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moved from a job in a university to an industry job (METI 2006).2 In what follows we 
discuss the three main moments when the risk of leaving an academic research career is 
higher, in the context of Japan. 
In most OECD countries, students have completed their doctoral research by the time they 
reach their early 30s; the median age of graduation is 33 in the US, 31 in Switzerland, and 32 
in Japan (Auriol 2010). Most PhD graduates who intend to pursue a career in academic 
research spend their first period after graduation in a temporary position such as a postdoc, 
before achieving their first assistant professor (or equivalent) position (Auriol et al. 2013). 
For example, in European countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain, the 
percentage of doctoral graduates on temporary contracts within the five years after graduation 
is around 40% (Auriol et al. 2013). In Japan, since 2005 doctoral graduates are awarded an 
assistant professor position after five or six years of postdoc employment on average, with 
only 15% of PhDs achieving this position immediately after graduation (Yamanoi 2007: Ch. 
12). The postdoc period has been extending in most countries (Stephan 2012). For example, 
in the US in 2006, only 15% of biology PhDs were in tenure-track positions six years after 
graduation, compared to 55% in 1973 (Stephan 2012). This discouraging and risky career 
prospect can dissuade even excellent academics from pursuing an academic research career. 
Among a sample of about 4,000 PhD students in US Tier 1 research universities, Sauermann 
and Roach (2012) show that an academic research career is considered attractive by only 
about a third of respondents in life sciences and physics. Other careers such as academic 
teaching, civil service, employment in an established firm or a start-up are perceived as 
extremely attractive by a large share of PhDs students; e.g., 53% of chemistry PhDs 
considered a job in an established company as the most attractive career path. 
A few studies have examined the determinants of career choice at this early stage. Gaughan 
                                                 
2 See section 4 for information on the Japanese academic context. 
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and Robin (2004) use US and French data and suggest that the prestige of the undergraduate 
institution is associated with the likelihood of obtaining the first tenure-track position. 
Similarly, Debackere and Rappa (1995) show that the prestige of the graduate school for 
American neural network scientists is significantly correlated with the prestige of the first 
employer.  
For those PhDs who survive the postdoc period and manage to secure an assistant professor 
position, the second critical point in the academic research career is the time at which the 
faculty member is considered for a tenured (permanent) position. In the US, tenure is usually 
awarded seven to nine years after initial hire (Stephan 2012). In other countries, the system is 
less structured and rolling or temporary contracts over periods of four to eight years are 
common. Failure to obtain tenure can often result in job mobility to a lower ranked university 
with more or only teaching duties, a move to a job in business, or exit from the market. A few 
studies have analyzed the probability of being awarded tenure. First, in a sample of 
biochemistry graduates from US universities, productivity measured by publication count is 
found to be positively associated with promotion from assistant to associate professor (with 
tenure), and to full professor (Long et al. 1993). Second, there is an important gender 
difference; several studies indicate that females are less likely to be given tenure, and have to 
wait longer for the offer of a permanent position (e.g., Ginther and Kahn 2004; Long et al. 
1993). Wolfinger et al. (2009) examine the contract types of first employment and suggest 
that female PhDs in the US are less likely to obtain tenured positions and more likely to exit 
the labor force. Third, academic mobility across institutions has an influence. Although 
mobility can contribute to researchers’ social capital and productivity, Long et al. (1993) and 
Cruz-Castro and Sanz-Menendez (2010) suggest that mobility delays promotion possibly 
because the ‘tenure clock’ is continually being reset.  
Finally, academic researchers that have obtained a tenured position (associate professorship) 
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may still choose to leave a research career to move to a job in a business organization or to 
refocus their academic profile towards a teaching and administrative position. 
 
3. Determinants of Exit 
This study examines exit from academic research drawing on search theory in labor 
economics (Burdett 1978; Jovanovic 1979; Mortensen and Pissarides 1994). Exiting from an 
academic research career depends on the probability of receiving an offer (and accepting it) 
to pursue a career in academic research compared to academic teaching, administration or 
industry. We identify individual, institutional, and geographical factors correlated to 
persistence in an academic research job. 
 
3.1. Individual Factor 
3.1.1. Scientific productivity 
The productivity of academics should affect their value in the labor market. Research 
organizations try to retain productive employees, and to dismiss less productive employees 
(Becker 1962). Highly productive academics have greater chances of both employment in a 
prestigious university (Allison and Long 1987), and of promotion (Long et al. 1993). These 
studies suggest consistently that the opportunity for a job in academic research should be 
higher for more productive academics who consequently have a lower probability of leaving 
an academic career (Brewer 1996). In parallel with their research responsibilities, academics 
usually engage in non-research activities such as teaching and administration. Some 
academics choose (or are forced) to concentrate on non-research jobs in academia and to give 
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up their researcher careers. The expertise required for teaching, administration, and research 
may coincide to a degree, so productive researchers could become productive teachers or 
good administrators. This raises the question of whether higher research productivity leads to 
a higher chance of a teaching or administration job offer. In relation to social status, salary, 
etc., academics seem to gain higher utility from a research job than from pure teaching or 
administration responsibilities.3 Thus, we hypothesize that productive researchers are unlikely 
to become teachers or administrators, and have a low probability of exit. However, we 
recognize that there are also a few cases in which extremely productive researchers become 
excellent administrators.4 
In some scientific fields where science and technology overlap such as transfer and Pasteur-
quadrant sciences (e.g. biomedical, software engineering), academic research expertise can be 
relevant for industry research. Thus, productive academics may attract job offers from 
business (Lazear 1984; Murnane et al. 1991). Stern (2004) and Sauermann and Roach (2014) 
suggest that scientists may choose industry jobs if the accompanying higher salaries 
compensate sufficiently for loss of freedom to do the research they like and to publish. 
Zucker et al. (2002) show that productive (measured by citations to their publications) 
academics are more likely to move to an industry job in the US biotech field. Thus, if the 
requirements for the industry job are academic research expertise, the effect of scientific 
productivity on exit could be positive. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Top executive administrative positions (e.g., provost, dean) may be both prestigious and lucrative. Researchers 
who leave research for such senior positions are regarded as examples of voluntary exit from academic research. 
However, the number of these job opportunities is limited. In Japan, executive administrators are often 
appointed from among professors within the university with some rotation pattern. 
4 See, for example, the case of David Baltimore Nobel laureate and president of the California Institute of 
Technology (Caltech) from 1997 to 2006. 
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3.1.2. Funding inputs 
Academics need research funding in order to undertake research. In many countries, non-
competitive block grants have been replaced by competitive funds. Since academics’ capacity 
to raise competitive funding is correlated with their productivity (Dasgupta and David 1994), 
we would expect the availability of competitive funds to be negatively correlated with the 
probability of exit since this type of funding is a research input. Even controlling for 
scientific productivity, stable funding could have a mitigating effect on exit. Academic 
research in the natural sciences in particular, is heavily dependent on large research funding 
support for laboratory costs and the salaries of PhDs and postdocs. Thus, securing funding is 
a major concern for laboratory heads (Shibayama et al. 2015; Stephan 2012). Secure funding 
should ensure a continuing research career (Donowitz et al. 2007; Zerhouni 2006) and 
increase its expected utility, thereby reducing potential exit. Thus, we expect that competitive 
funding inputs are negatively associated with the likelihood of exit. 
 
3.1.3. Gender 
It is well-known that women are underrepresented in academia. For example, Auriol et al. 
(2013) show that less than 40% of PhD graduates in most OECD countries are female. In 
Japan, the gender imbalance is particularly pronounced5 with women accounting for only 
26% of all PhD graduates in 2006 (NISTEP 2009a). Female researchers are more likely to 
have child rearing and domestic responsibilities which are likely to cause earlier exit. Female 
researchers are less likely to obtain tenure, and to take longer to achieve it (Ginther and Kahn 
2004; Long et al. 1993; Wolfinger et al. 2009). For example, although the situation has 
                                                 
5 Japan, ranked 21st in the UN’s gender inequality index, lags behind most OECD countries for improving the 
gender gap, (http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/gii). 
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improved over recent decades, in 2010 in the US, females accounted for 44%, 37% and 22% 
respectively of assistant, associate and full professor positions, (National Science Board 
2014: Ch.5). The statistics for Japan show that, in the natural sciences, only 15.7% of 
assistant professors are female and a mere 3.8% achieve the position of full professor 
(NISTEP 2009b: 2-16). Based on these findings, we expect that females are more likely than 
males to exit an academic research career. 
 
3.1.4. Academic career 
Search theory shows that length of employment in the same organization stabilizes relations 
between employee and employer, and reduces job quit (Farber 1994; Jovanovic 1979). In the 
academic context, Crespi et al. (2007) show that the longer the academic remains in one 
university, the less likely he/she will move from academia to industry. This would seem to 
support the negative relationship between tenure and exit. However, it is plausible also that 
academic institutions appoint researchers with long tenure but diminished research 
excellence, to non-research positions. Thus, tenure could be correlated either positively or 
negatively with exit. 
Job rank (assistant, associate, full professor, etc.) should also affect exit. Promotion is usually 
associated with research performance; greater seniority equates with greater propensity to do 
research. In addition, seniority brings greater job security and a higher salary, resulting in 
greater expected utility from an academic research career. Overall, we expect that job rank is 
negatively associated with the likelihood of exit. 
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3.1.5. Academic network 
When academics are well embedded in a scientific community and have good connections 
with other academics, they are kept apprised of job vacancies. Zucker et al. (2002) show that 
the academic’s external network, measured by the proportion of co-authors from different 
institutions, leads to mobility from academia to industry. Also, Crespi et al. (2007) indicate 
that network, measured by collaboration with external organizations, facilitates mobility from 
universities to public research organizations (PROs). Applying this evidence to the academic 
network, one can expect that researchers with good individual academic network connections 
will also be better informed about academic research job opportunities which consequently 
will reduce the likelihood of exit. This may be particularly true in the Japanese context where 
human relationships (connections) play an important role in the recruitment of academics 
(Yamanoi 2007). 
 
3.2. Institutional Factor 
3.2.1. Research organization 
An institutional factor that is known to influence academic career is organizational prestige. 
Undergraduate or graduate study at a prestigious organization is found to be a good predictor 
of future academic employment (Gaughan and Robin 2004) and promotion (Long et al. 
1993). In addition, it has been suggested that prior experience in an excellent organization 
leads to future employment in a prestigious organization (Allison and Long 1987; Debackere 
and Rappa 1995). These studies imply that organizational prestige should increase job offers 
for academic researchers and lead to higher expected utility, lowering the likelihood of exit. 
Prestige is a complex concept that encompasses several factors. First, prestige is associated 
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with the availability of resources for research. In general, prestigious organizations have more 
and larger sources of revenue, can invest more generously in research, and can maintain 
better facilities for individual researchers to conduct state-of-the-art research. This should 
increase the expected utility of an academic research career. A second factor is the 
institutional academic network. Prestigious organizations can employ excellent researchers 
and attract excellent external collaborators. This provides individual academics with 
advantages in the form of opportunities for intellectual interactions with peers, and access to 
their social capital. Thus, we expect that institutional capital, measured as funding input and 
institutional academic network (peer effects and social capital), will be negatively correlated 
with exit. 
 
3.2.2. Scientific fields 
In the context of academic research, individual academics have an affiliation to their 
particular university, and become deeply embedded in their respective scientific fields. Thus, 
their career paths should be affected by the characteristics of their field. These include 
academia-industry linkages which can increase job offers from industry, and are particularly 
important in Pasteur-quadrant sciences (compared to pure basic science) (Stokes 1997), 
where mobility between academia and business involves lower transaction costs and is more 
common, resulting in higher levels of exit. Field growth is another factor; in expanding fields, 
employment is more likely to increase and the enhanced job prospects should improve the 
expected utility of an academic research career. Therefore, the probability of exit will be 
higher in Pasteur-quadrant scientific fields, and field growth will be negatively associated 
with exit. 
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3.3 Geographical/labor market factors 
In general, a career change involves a different work place. A geographical change incurs 
search and moving costs, so job vacancies in the same geographical vicinity should be 
associated with a higher likelihood of a job change. Disentangling types of employers, 
Zucker et al. (2002) show that mobility from academia to industry is positively associated 
with the number of biotech firms, and negatively associated with the number of top-rated 
universities in the area. The effect of concentration of universities is unclear because 
universities offer both research and teaching jobs. In an attempt to disentangle these two 
types of employment opportunities, we expect that the local concentration of research-
intensive universities will be negatively correlated with exit, while local concentration of 
teaching-oriented universities will be positively correlated with exit. We control also for the 
size of the local labor market and supply of qualified researchers. 
 
4. Context of Japanese Academia 
Japan has three types of universities - national, regional (i.e., city and prefectural), and 
private universities - which offer four-year degree courses and postgraduate education. In 
1985 (our sample is composed of academics who obtained a PhD degree in 1985-1989), 
Japan had 95 national, 34 regional, and 331 private universities,6 with national universities 
focused on academic research, and most private universities focused on teaching. In 1985, 
73% of undergraduate students were enrolled in private universities, and 24% in national 
universities, while 38% of graduate students were enrolled in private or regional universities, 
and 62% in national universities. In terms of research funding, in 1985, national universities 
                                                 
6 School Survey conducted by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT; 
http://www.e-stat.go.jp/). 
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received 77% (decreased to 67% in 2010) of the total GiA budget, the primary national 
research funding system in Japan. Among national universities, the seven pre-imperial 
universities (Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka, Tohoku, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Nagoya) are considered 
exceptionally prestigious for both research and education. Academic research is also 
conducted in PROs (e.g., RIKEN). 7  In 2004, PROs employed approximately 10% of 
researchers, and universities 90% (METI 2006: 264). 
Japanese universities have a three-level promotion system from the entry position of assistant 
professor or lecturer, to associate professor, and finally full professor.8  Currently, before 
being appointed to an entry position, academics - especially in natural sciences – must spend 
a few years as a postdoc. In 2005, the average postdoc period was five or six years (Yamanoi 
2007: Ch.12). In the 1980s, postdocs were less common, and young academics were often 
appointed as assistants or lecturers directly after graduation. According to a national survey of 
natural scientists (NISTEP 2009b), among respondents aged 26-36 years in 1990 23.5% had 
held a postdoc position, 70.5% had not. Among the former, approximately 80% spent three 
years or less as a postdoc. 
Japan’s academic system has a few relevant features. First, it used to be characterized by 
lifetime employment (Shimbori 1981; Takahashi and Takahashi 2009). Until a series of 
reforms in the 2000s allowed temporary employment, entry positions were mostly permanent 
(Watanabe 2011). Second, many Japanese universities operate a hierarchical “chair” system 
(Yamanoi 2007). The system use to be, and sometimes still is, led by a full professor (the 
“chair”), responsible for a small team of junior researchers in entry positions and perhaps an 
associate professor. Thus, while junior researchers in entry positions were cleared of 
unemployment risk, they had to (and have to) compete to be promoted and win a position of 
                                                 
7 http://www.riken.jp/en/ 
8 The position of assistant professor was officially introduced in Japanese universities in 2007. Previous to this, 
the position was designated “assistant” (Watanabe 2011). 
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an independent researcher. Third, Japan’s employment practice is characterized by high 
rigidity and very low cross-sectoral mobility. According to a government statistic (METI 
2006: 264) in 2004, only 1.1% of researchers (8,800 out of 790,900) moved across the three 
sectors of industry, government, and academia. In the same year, 97.4% of 291,100 university 
researchers were not mobile, 2.3% moved between two universities, 0.11% moved to 
industry, and 0.15% moved to government (i.e., PROs). Thus, industry is a less frequent 
destination for academics who leave university employment and exit is more likely due to 
academics giving up research and remaining in academia in a teaching or administrative 
position. 
 
5. Data Description and Variable Measurement 
5.1. Sample and Data 
Our sample is composed of a cohort of 13,776 PhD graduates who were awarded a PhD 
degree in hard science (all scientific fields except social sciences and humanities) in the 
period 1985-1989.9  We focus on the 1985-1989 cohort because a reform to the funding 
system allowed significantly more junior researchers to obtain grants since the mid 1980s 
(the number of junior grantees in 1980-1984 is about half the number in 1985-1989). This 
allows us to trace academic careers more precisely for up to 20 years. The data on PhD 
graduates were obtained from the Japanese National Library database10 which provides full 
                                                 
9  We exclude social sciences and the humanities because our theoretical framework to explain exit from 
academic research does not apply to these fields. PhD graduates from these fields account for 3.2%. We also 
exclude foreign-born graduates because name matching (explained later) for foreigners is difficult for non-
unique notations of foreign names in Japanese characters, and because non-native Japanese graduates are 
unlikely to pursue an academic career in Japan (Franzoni et al. 2012). Foreign-students account for 7.3% of all 
PhD graduates. Finally, we do not include so-called paper-based PhDs who are awarded the degree on the basis 
of their research output (often based on corporate research experience) with no course work requirement; paper-
based degrees are usually awarded to senior researchers and their inclusion would bias the analysis. 
10 Universities are obliged to archive all PhD dissertations in the National Library. The library creates electronic 
data upon receiving dissertations. There is open access to the database (http://opac.ndl.go.jp/). 
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names, degree field, year of degree award, etc. 
To trace careers and identify exit from an academic research career, we exploit the GiA 
program database. The GiA program is the largest source of funding for academic research in 
Japan and covers all scientific fields and all ranks of researchers.11 A survey of GiA grantees 
in 2006 indicates that only 3% of academic researchers depended for the majority of their 
research budget on funding sources other than GiA, and that this rate differs between fields 
with a maximum of 13% in engineering (Iida 2007: Ch.6).12 Thus, we can reasonably assume 
that researchers who have never received GiA funding, or have not continued to receive it, 
most likely stopped doing academic research.13 For each grant award, the database provides 
full names of grantees,14 grant size, affiliations, collaborators, associated publications after 
completion of the grant, fields of research, etc. 
We created two datasets; the first includes cross-sectional information for the whole 13,776 
PhD graduates, and the second includes information on 5,599 GiA grantees for the period 
1990-2012. We linked the two databases on the basis of full names of PhD graduates and GiA 
grantees and found 5,599 matches among the 13,776 PhD graduates.15  We consider that 
unmatched PhD graduates who never received GiA funding, exited before embarking on a 
professional academic research career (pre-employment exit).  
We built an unbalanced panel that consists of the matched 5,599 PhD graduates who have 
                                                 
11  General information on GiA can be accessed from the MEXT website 
(http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/shinkou/hojyo/main5_a5.htm). Kneller (2010) and Asonuma (2002) provide 
overviews of the GiA and the general budgetary structure in Japanese universities. The GiA database provides 
information on all grants awarded under the system since 1965, covering 210,000 university researchers. 
12Among the top 7 national universities, about 84% of full and associate professors had received GiA funding at 
least once in the period 2001-2005 (Shibayama 2011). Our exit measure might be less reliable for researchers in 
private universities, where dependence on GiA is lower. 
13 GiA grants are also awarded to researchers in PROs. Since PRO researchers are less dependent on competitive 
funding, our data might miss very active researchers in PROs and overstate exit. However, we believe that this 
effect is limited because of the higher mobility from PROs to universities (10%) and much lower mobility from 
universities to PROs (0.1%) (METI 2006: 264). 
14 The database includes two types of grantees: principal investigator (one or more) and members.  
15  Name ambiguity is not a serious problem since full names in Chinese characters are available in both 
databases. For some common names, we differentiate by year of graduation, and funding and scientific field. 
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received GiA funding at least once, and trace their career until exit or up to 2010. We 
consider that an academic who appeared in the GiA database but then disappeared has exited 
from an academic research career after a spell of academic employment (post-employment 
exit). Although the two original databases do not provide information on age, we can assume 
that PhD degrees were awarded at around 26-31 years of age (NISTEP 2009a). Since the 
retirement age in most universities in Japan was 60 (although this has now been extended), it 
is unlikely that researchers that exited our sample after having started an academic research 
career would be retired since they should be around 57 years old in 2010. 
 
5.2. Dependent Variables 
For pre-employment exit, we prepared a dummy variable that takes the value zero if a PhD 
graduate is matched with the funding database and 1 otherwise. The matching rate is 41%, 
and thus, the rate of pre-employment exit is 59%. 
For post-employment exit, we prepared a dummy variable that is coded 1 for the last year the 
academic received a grant from GiA, and zero otherwise. We used the year 2012 version of 
the GiA database, and regard academics whose latest record in the database occurred in 2010 
or later, as survivors, on the assumption that research-active academics are funded at least 
once in five years.16  
 
5.3. Independent Variables 
We prepared several independent variables for the individual, institutional, and geographical 
factors discussed above, drawing on the funding database and other public data sources. To 
                                                 
16 Most funding is for 3-5 year periods. 
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analyze pre-employment exit, we took year of PhD graduation as the measurement year. 
For individual level measures we include eight variables. The funding database provides the 
number of publications resulting from each funded project. By dividing this publication count 
by the number of project members and project duration, we can compute a yearly publication 
count for each academic. Since publication count can differ by field and year, we 
standardized this measure by field/year mean and standard deviation. We then compute the 
accumulated count of publications prior to each year (pub stock). We divide funding amount 
for each project by the number of project members and project duration, and summed them 
for each year, for each academic, to compute a yearly funding input. We standardize this by 
the field/year mean and standard deviation to compute stock value (fund stock). We code a 
dummy variable (female) 1 for female and zero for male. For academic career, we compute 
the number of years of employment each academic had in a university (job tenure). For 
academic rank, we constructed two dummy variables: the variable full prof takes the value 1 
for full professor, and the variable associate prof takes the value 1 for associate professor. For 
academic network, we count the cumulative number of co-grantees related to a researcher’s 
GiA funding (#cograntee) and we also control for the number of universities to which a 
researcher was affiliated (mobility). 
We constructed four variables for institutional factors. The top seven national universities in 
Japan are regarded as prestigious research-intensive universities. To measure organizational 
prestige, we include a dummy variable that scores 1 for the top seven universities, and zero 
otherwise (top7). University-level funding input is computed as follows. We first compute the 
GiA funds for each intersection of university, field, and year, and then total funds for each 
field/year. We divide the former by the latter to calculate the proportion of funding distributed 
to each university (%univ fund). To measure the importance of the institutional academic 
network of the grantee university (as a proxy for peer effects and social capital), we count the 
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number of GiA grantees (only principal investigators) in each year in the same university and 
the same field (#researcher). To estimate field growth, we count the number of grantees (only 
principal investigators) in each year and each field, and calculate the annual growth rate (field 
growth). 
Finally, for geographic factors, we constructed four variables at the level of the 47 
prefectures. We collected the number of jobs in national universities located in each 
prefecture as a proxy for academic research jobs (#national university employment), and the 
number of jobs in private universities as a proxy for teaching-oriented job opportunities 
(#private university employment).17 This is based on the assumption that national universities 
tend to be research-intensive and private universities tend to be teaching-oriented. We also 
collected employment numbers for each prefecture as a measure of employment opportunities 
in the private sector (#industrial employment).18 Finally, we take number of PhD graduates in 
universities in the same prefecture to measure the labor supply (#PhD graduate). 
 
6. Econometric Model and Results 
The structure of our data allows us to analyze exit at a few distinct moments: (1) immediately 
after PhD graduation (pre-employment exit), (2) after the academic embarks on a 
professional researcher career (post-employment exit), divided into (2a) before achieving a 
tenured position, i.e., assistant professor (pre-tenure exit), and (2b) after achieving tenure, 
i.e., associate or full professor (post-tenure exit).19 Section 6.1 presents the estimations for 
                                                 
17  Source: School Survey conducted by the MEXT 
(http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/toukei/chousa01/kihon/1267995.htm). 
18  Labor Survey conducted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 
(http://www.stat.go.jp/data/roudou/index.htm). Since data are available from 1997, data for the years 1985-1996 
are imputed from year 1997. Employment numbers have been stable since the late 1990s. 
19 As discussed above, assistant professor positions were mostly permanent in the past. Thus, in our empirical 
setting, tenured position has the meaning of being granted the promotion to associate professor, academic rank 
that is usually associated to a tenured position in the US.  
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exit at moment (1) drawing on cross-sectional data for 13,776 PhD graduates, and estimates 
the likelihood of pre-employment exit by logit regressions.  
In sections 6.2 and 6.3 we examine exit at moments (2a) and (2b). We use panel data for the 
whole careers of the 5,599 PhD graduates who received GiA funding at least once. We 
estimate the likelihood of post-employment exit by survival analysis, drawing on a duration 
model that allows us to analyze a point event (referred to as a failure event) which occurs 
after a certain period of time (spell length). The average spell length is 17 years. We draw on 
a discrete approach based on the complementary log-log (cloglog) model. 20  Based on 
Prentice and Gloeckler (1978), the discrete hazard time for individual i in time interval t to 
exit is estimated by the following function: 
hit = 1 – exp{– exp(βXi + θ(t))} 
where hit is the hazard rate and θ(t) is the baseline hazard function with spell duration 
(Jenkins 1995). A set of time dummy variables is included to capture the unobserved time-
varying effect on the likelihood of exit. 
6.1. Pre-employment Exit 
We first examine pre-employment exit defined by no award of GiA funding. Table 1 presents 
basic information on exit by field, university, and gender. Table 1A provides a breakdown by 
PhD degree field: Medicine (49.1%), Engineering (15.4%), Science (16.0%), Dentistry 
(10.0%), Agriculture (5.9%), and Pharmacy (3.6%). Exit rates differ substantially by field. 
PhDs in Engineering and Science show relatively low exit rate (~51%), or the highest rate of 
survival in an academic research career. Three medical fields (Medicine, Dentistry, 
Pharmacy) show high exit rates (> 60%), probably because of substantial demand for their 
                                                 
20 A continuous approach can be employed. A Cox (1972) semi-parametric model yields a similar pattern of 
results. 
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labor in practitioner jobs (doctors, dentists, pharmacists, etc.).  
 
Table 1 Description of Pre-employment Exit 
(A) By Field 
PhD Field  #Graduate #Matched %Exit 
Science 2,202 (16.0%) 1,068 (19.1%) 51.5% 
Engineering 2,120 (15.4%) 1,049 (18.7%) 50.5% 
Agriculture 817 (5.9%) 356 (6.4%) 56.4% 
Pharmacy 497 (3.6%) 175 (3.1%) 64.8% 
Medicine 6,762 (49.1%) 2,416 (43.2%) 64.3% 
Dentistry 1,378 (10.0%) 535 (9.6%) 61.2% 
Total 13,776 (100.0%) 5,599 (100.0%) 59.4% 
 
(B) By University  
Rank University #Graduate #Matched %Exit 
1 U Tokyo 1,317 (9.6%) 643 (11.5%) 51.2% 
2 Kyoto U 1,030 (7.5%) 507 (9.1%) 50.8% 
3 Osaka U 704 (5.1%) 365 (6.5%) 48.2% 
4 Tohoku U 607 (4.4%) 302 (5.4%) 50.2% 
5 Kyushu U 553 (4.0%) 298 (5.3%) 46.1% 
6 Hokkaido U 509 (3.7%) 226 (4.0%) 55.6% 
7 Nagoya U 459 (3.3%) 241 (4.3%) 47.5% 
 Top 7 5,179 (37.6%) 2,582 (46.1%) 50.1% 
10 Tsukuba U 294 (2.1%) 119 (2.1%) 59.5% 
20 Keio U 164 (1.2%) 74 (1.3%) 54.9% 
30 Tokyo Jikei Med U 118 (0.9%) 59 (1.1%) 50.0% 
40 Akita U 92 (0.7%) 28 (0.5%) 69.6% 
50 Hamamatsu Med U 68 (0.5%) 23 (0.4%) 66.2% 
 Total 13,776 (100.0%) 5,599 100.0% 59.4% 
Notes: Ranked by the number of PhD graduates.  
 
(C) By Gender 
PhD Field 
#Graduate  #Matched  %Exit %Exit 
Female/Male Male Female %Female  Male Female %Female  Male Female 
Science 2,053 149 6.8%  1,016 52 4.9%  50.5% 65.1% 1.29 
Engineering 2,055 65 3.1%  1,024 25 2.4%  50.2% 61.5% 1.23 
Agriculture 740 77 9.4%  339 17 4.8%  54.2% 77.9% 1.44 
Pharmacy 452 45 9.1%  162 13 7.4%  64.2% 71.1% 1.11 
Medicine 6,150 612 9.1%  2,277 139 5.8%  63.0% 77.3% 1.23 
Dentistry 1,269 109 7.9%  501 34 6.4%  60.5% 68.8% 1.14 
Total 12,719 1,057 7.7%  5,319 280 5.0%  58.2% 73.5% 1.26 
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Table 1B provides a breakdown by PhD awarding university. During 1985-1989, 142 
universities awarded at least one PhD degree in hard sciences. The top seven universities 
accounted for 37.6% of PhDs, and their exit rates are somewhat lower (50%). Lower-ranked 
universities show higher exit rates, implying that more academic research jobs are given to 
graduates from top universities. 
Table 1C provides a breakdown by gender and field. The proportion of females in all PhD 
graduates is 7.7%. In all fields, exit rates are higher for females (73.5%) than males (58.2%). 
The gender difference is greatest in Agriculture (1.44 times more for females than males) and 
least in Pharmacy (1.11 times). The three fields with the highest exit rates for female 
scientists are Agriculture (78%), Medicine (77%), and Pharmacy (71%). 
 
Table 2 Prediction of Pre-employment Exit 
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Individual factors          
  graduation year .021 * (.012) .025  (.020) .015  (.021) 
  female .688 *** (.072) .653 *** (.073) .650 *** (.073) 
Institutional factors          
  top7    -.173 *** (.060) -.189 *** (.061) 
  ln(#researcher)    -.252 *** (.030) -.244 *** (.032) 
  field growth    .026  (.136) .016  (.136) 
  field dummies    YES   YES   
Geographical factors          
  ln(#national univ employment)       -.223 *** (.073) 
  ln(#private univ employment)       .049 ** (.020) 
  ln(#industrial employment)       -.014  (.047) 
  ln(#PhD graduate)       .108 * (.060) 
             
χ2 test 102.927 ***  510.962 ***  537.174 ***  
Log likelihood -9254.68   -9050.67   -9037.56   
N   13776   13776   13776   
Notes: Logit regressions. Unstandardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). Two-tailed test.  
*: p<0.1; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01. 
 
Table 2 shows the regression results. We regress pre-employment exit using a logit regression 
model. Appendix 1A provides descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables. Model 1 
suggests that females are significantly more likely to exit before employment. This effect 
remains strong after introducing other factors in Models 2 and 3. 
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Model 2 includes institutional factors, and suggests two determinants of exit. Affiliation 
during PhD training has a significant effect; graduates from top universities are less likely to 
exit which is consistent with our hypothesis and summary data. Moreover, the number of 
researchers who received a GiA grant in the same university and field, proxy for institutional 
academic network, decreases the likelihood of exit. This may be because they help PhD 
graduates find employment through their large research network or because research active 
departments have greater capacity to employ PhD graduates on a temporary basis. 
Field dummies are collectively significant. The fields of Dentistry and Engineering show the 
lowest exit propensity while Medicine shows the highest propensity. Since career structure 
might differ with scientific field, we ran the same set of regressions separately for each field. 
The statistical significance varies across fields but the sign of the correlation is mostly 
consistent with the aggregate results (see Appendix 2A for summary results). 
Model 3 also includes geographical factors. Employment in research-intensive national 
universities has a negative effect, suggesting that the availability of academic research jobs in 
the vicinity reduces the likelihood of exit, as hypothesized. In contrast, and as expected, 
employment in teaching-oriented private universities, increases the likelihood of exit (move 
to a teaching oriented job). Employment in industry does not have a significant effect. 
Finally, a large number of graduates from the same geographical area facilitates exit perhaps 
due to over-supply and competition for research jobs. 
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Figure 1 Survivor functions (N = 5,264) 
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6.2. Post-employment Exit 
For academics who do not exit immediately after graduation (i.e. awarded funding at least 
once), we compute survivor functions (Figure 1). Figure 1A illustrates the function for the 
whole sample, indicating that academic exit was steady, with 40% persisting after 25 years in 
research. Job ranks at the time of exit, or final position of survivors is full professor (40%), 
associate professor (22%), and assistants or lecturer (38%). 
We compute survivor functions for a few sample subsets. Figure 1B highlights field 
differences based on funding fields.21 Funding fields consist of Clinical Medicine (35.1%), 
                                                 
21 For those academics who did not exit immediately after graduation, we distinguish fields in slightly more 
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Engineering (15.1%), Mathematics and Physics (11.1%), Dentistry (10.6%), Biology (7.9%), 
Agriculture (5.7%), Chemistry (4.5%), and Pharmacy (2.3%). The survivor function shows 
particularly rapid exit in Clinical Medicine and Dentistry followed by Pharmacy. The other 
fields follow a similar trend with about 60% remaining after 25 years. In terms of PhD 
affiliation, the top seven universities account for 50% of those PhD graduates who remain in 
academic research. Graduates from these universities are significantly less likely to leave 
than those from other universities (Figure 1C). Finally, females, who account for 7.7% of 
those PhD graduates who remain in academic research, are more likely to exit than males 
(Figure 1D). 
Table 3 shows the regression results for post-employment exit. Appendix 1A provides 
descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables. Model 1 includes only individual-level 
factors. Publication stock has a significantly negative coefficient, suggesting that high 
performers tend to continue in academic research. This effect is consistent after controlling 
for other factors in Models 2 and 3. Funding input has a negative coefficient, implying that 
larger yearly research funding for individual academics facilitates long-term engagement in 
academic research. Though Model 1 shows a negative sign for female, it turns insignificant 
when we control for institutional and geographical factors (Models 2 and 3). Job tenure has a 
negative effect on mobility; i.e., academics who stay for longer in the same university are less 
likely to exit. Seniority reduces the likelihood of exit; i.e., assistant professors are more likely 
to exit than associate professors, and associate professors are more likely to exit than full 
professors, which is in line with our hypothesis. For the individual network effect, the 
number of co-grantees shows significantly positive coefficients, which is contrary to our 
expectation that a larger academic network helps job search. This result is discussed further in 
section 6.3. Finally, previous mobility has a negative coefficient, suggesting that mobile 
                                                                                                                                                        
detail drawing on the GiA database. Medicine is split into Basic Medicine and Clinical Medicine; Science is 
split into Biology, Chemistry, Mathematics, and Physics. 
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academics tend to remain in academic research for longer. However, this effect decreases 
when we control for institutional and geographical factors (Model 3). One interpretation of 
this result is that mobility might be forced rather than voluntary, and that lower performers 
who are less likely to be granted tenured positions need to move to lower ranked institutions 
to obtain more secure and teaching-oriented job.  
In relation to institutional factors, our results suggest that academics in prestigious 
universities (top7) tend to stay longer in academic research which supports our hypothesis. 
The coefficient of number of researchers in the same university and same field is significantly 
negative, showing a decreasing likelihood of exit and confirming the presence of an 
institutional peer and social capital effect.22 As for funding input at the university level, we 
find a small positive correlation with exit, contrary to our hypothesis, which largely 
disappears in Model 3. After controlling for social capital and peer effects (#researcher) and 
organizational prestige (top7), resource input may have only a limited impact on the 
likelihood of exit. 
                                                 
22 The number of researchers may be confounded by the size factor, since we control for the proportion of 
funding distributed to the university (%univ fund), we can interpret the number of researchers in the field in the 
university as a proxy for social capital and peer effect. 
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Table 3  Prediction of Post-employment Exit 
 
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Individual factors                   
  pub stock -.027 *** (.005) -.032 *** (.005) -.041 *** (.005) 
  fund stock -.019 *** (.005) -.009 * (.004) -.015 *** (.005) 
  female -.268 *** (.086) -.094   (.087) .045   (.087) 
  job tenure -.050 *** (.005) -.025 *** (.006) -.011 * (.006) 
  associate prof -.644 *** (.058) -.578 *** (.058) -.370 *** (.058) 
  full prof -.892 *** (.077) -.980 *** (.077) -.704 *** (.078) 
  mobility -.323 *** (.048) -.565 *** (.053) -.134 ** (.054) 
  ln(#cograntee) .119 *** (.021) .243 *** (.022) .231 *** (.023) 
Institutional factors                   
  top7       -.197 *** (.071) -.272 *** (.072) 
  %univ fund       .023 ** (.010) -.001   (.012) 
  ln(#researcher)       -.591 *** (.020) -.245 *** (.028) 
  field growth       -1.521 *** (.190) -.601 ** (.239) 
  field dummies       YES     YES     
Geographical factors                   
  ln(#national univ employment)             -.568 *** (.045) 
  ln(#private univ employment)             .066 *** (.023) 
  ln(#industrial employment)             -.429 *** (.038) 
  ln(#PhD graduate)             .504 *** (.042) 
                      
χ2 test 30402.90  ***   29968.97  ***          29933.20  ***          
Log likelihood -13749.33     -12434.98             -11849.05             
N   93474     93474            93474            
Notes: Complementary log-log model. Unstandardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses).  
Two-tailed test. *p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
Among field-related factors, Model 2 shows that field growth has a significantly negative 
coefficient. This suggests that in expanding fields, exit is less frequent, although when we 
control for geographic/labor market characteristics (Model 3), the effect becomes smaller. 
The field dummies collectively are significant. Among the nine fields, for post-employment 
exit we observe a relatively low propensity in Biology, Mathematics and Physics, and 
Pharmacy, and high propensity in Clinical Medicine and Dentistry. We examined field 
difference by running the regressions separately for each field (see Appendix 2B for summary 
results). 
Model 3 includes geographical factors. We observe a negative coefficient of number of jobs 
in national universities, suggesting that a higher number of researcher positions facilitates an 
academic career. We observe a positive coefficient of number of jobs in private universities, 
suggesting that the higher the number of teaching positions, the shorter the time taken for 
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academics to leave academic research and accept a job in a teaching university. Model 3 
indicates also that more PhD graduates from the same geographical area increase the 
likelihood of exit, suggesting the effect of oversupply. Finally, the number of jobs in industry 
has a negative coefficient. This effect is particularly strong for Biology, Engineering and 
Basic Medicine (see Appendix 2B), maybe indicating that the presence of a proximate sizable 
industry sector increases the chances of industry funding allowing researchers to continue 
doing research.  
 
Figure 2 Baseline hazard function  
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Figure 2 depicts the estimated baseline hazard functions according to the predictions in 
Model 3, Table 3, for the set of PhD graduates who received GiA funding at least once. To 
draw the graphs, we average the predictions of the dependent variables for each subgroup. 
The cloglog models include dummy variables for each time period (year), which collectively 
are strongly significant. Figure 2A indicates that the probability of exit is initially relatively 
high, then it decreases, and after about 10 years starts to increase. By the end of the period the 
probability of exit is similar to the initial level. The early peak represents researchers who are 
trying to develop an academic research career - probably during their postdoctoral or assistant 
professorship period - prior to obtaining a tenured position. The later increase in the hazard 
rate would seem to correspond to academics leaving research and moving to non-research 
jobs. 
Figure 2B compares initial affiliations and shows that the likelihood of exit from academic 
research is lower throughout the whole career, for academics who graduated from a 
prestigious university. Figure 2C compares gender effects, and shows a much higher exit 
probability in the early and later career stages for females.  
 
6.3. Career-Stage Differences 
Table 4 compares two career stages - before obtaining a tenured position, i.e., assistant 
professor (Model 1), and after achieving a tenured position, i.e. associate and full professor 
(Model 2). Scientific productivity is found to decrease the probability of exit in both stages. 
Funding stock, as expected, has a negative effect in both stages. We find that females are 
more likely to exit (though insignificant) during the junior stage but if they obtain a tenured 
position, their likelihood of exit is smaller than that of males (Takahashi and Takahashi 2010, 
2009). Job tenure shows a negative effect turning insignificant in the senior stage, implying 
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that academics might be assigned non-research jobs after very long employment. Mobility 
has a negative effect only in the senior stage. The observed mobility might be largely forced 
and associated with low performance in the junior stage.23 The number of co-grantees is 
negatively correlated to exit in the senior career phase, indicating that the individual 
academic network exerts a moderating impact on exit only when the researcher has achieved 
a senior position and a well developed, consolidated academic network. 
 
Table 4 Prediction of Post-employment Exit by Career-Stage 
 
    
Model 1 
(pre-tenure) 
Model 2 
(post-tenure) 
Individual factors             
  pub stock -.024 *** (.008) -.047 *** (.007) 
  fund stock -.013 * (.008) -.011 * (.006) 
  female .109   (.098) -.355 * (.196) 
  job tenure -.030 ** (.013) -.002   (.007) 
  full prof       -.376 *** (.073) 
  mobility -.015   (.089) -.258 *** (.073) 
  ln(#cograntee) .374 *** (.029) -.133 *** (.038) 
Institutional factors             
  top7 -.360 *** (.084) -.029   (.143) 
  %univ fund -.031 ** (.015) .029   (.020) 
  ln(#researcher) -.081 ** (.041) -.359 *** (.039) 
  field growth -.695 ** (.298) -.065   (.411) 
  field dummies YES     YES     
Geographical factors             
  ln(#national univ employment) -.687 *** (.056) -.336 *** (.082) 
  ln(#private univ employment) .077 *** (.026) .000   (.046) 
  ln(#industrial employment) -.452 *** (.047) -.325 *** (.070) 
  ln(#PhD graduate) .584 *** (.054) .366 *** (.075) 
                
χ2 test 18155.60  ***   10850.07  ***          
Log likelihood -7463.89      -4197.72             
N   57072     36402            
Notes: Complementary log-log model. Unstandardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses).  
Two-tailed test. *p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
 
Among institutional factors, university prestige is influential only during the junior stage, 
suggesting that tenure is more often awarded to graduates from top universities who may be 
benefiting from institutional prestige. The number of researchers in the same university 
                                                 
23 Mobility and performance are negatively correlated during the junior stage. 
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decreases the likelihood of exit particularly at senior levels, once again indicating that 
positive network effects are relevant only for senior academics. Geographic/labor market 
control factors have a similar effect in both stages although the number of jobs in private 
universities is significantly correlated only with exit by assistant professors, indicating that 
the choice to take up a career in a more teaching oriented university is usually made at an 
early stage. 
 
7. Conclusions 
This chapter has examined the individual level determinants of exit from an academic 
research career, controlling for institutional and geographic/labor market influencing factors, 
informed by the literature on academic mobility and academic careers (e.g., Allison and Long 
1990; Crespi et al. 2007), and search theory in labor economics (e.g., Mortensen and 
Pissarides 1994). The up-or-out nature of an academic research career results in some 
academic researchers being forced to abandon an academic research career despite huge 
investments such as fellowships and supervisory support. This career selection process might 
be compromised by biased selection criteria, or a badly designed academic system, leading to 
unintended exit. Although this is a practical concern (e.g., Cyranoski et al. 2011; Donowitz et 
al. 2007; Ginther et al. 2011), few studies have examined exit from academia. The study 
described in this chapter is an attempt to fill this gap, based on a sample of Japanese 
academics in hard sciences. 
The results confirm that productive academics are more likely to continue to do research, 
suggesting that the selection process is based at least partly on merit which is in line with the 
literature on academic careers (Allison and Long 1987; Becker 1962; Long et al. 1993). From 
a search theory perspective, the opposite effect is also plausible - that productive researchers 
attract offers of industry jobs or non-research jobs in academia; however, the results do not 
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support this argument. Thus, scientific productivity increases job opportunities in academic 
research significantly more than other jobs. Coupled with the very low mobility from 
academia to industry in Japan (METI 2006), this result might suggest that the demand for 
labor from industry is not adequately addressed by the academic system. 
We also examined the impact of individual level funding and found that funding decreases 
the likelihood of exit. With regard to discrimination in the selection process, our results show 
that females are more likely to exit an academic research career than males, which is 
consistent with the findings for other countries (e.g., Ginther and Kahn 2004; Long et al. 
1993). We found that this effect is especially strong immediately after graduation (73.5% for 
females vs. 58.2% for males), less strong during the junior stage (3.9% vs. 3.2%), and is 
reversed during the senior career stage (2.3% vs. 2.8%).24  However, the share of active 
female researchers at senior level (associate and full professor) is very low (4.4%). The 
Japanese government has implemented several policies to try to mitigate the gender gap but it 
seems that further intervention is needed. We found also that the number of co-grantees 
decreases the likelihood of exit only after award of a tenured position, suggesting that the 
effect of individual social capital may be moderated by seniority. 
In relation to institutional factors, as Gaughan and Robin (2004) and Debackere and Rappa 
(1995) imply, academics in prestigious universities are less likely to exit at the start of their 
careers (50% for the top seven vs. 65% for the rest) and during the assistant professor period 
(1.5% vs. 4.2%). 25  Since academic inbreeding is common - particularly in high-ranked 
universities in Japan (Yamanoi 2007), our result might indicate that opportunities for 
academics whose careers start in low-ranked universities are unreasonably hampered. From a 
science policy perspective, mobility across institutions should be facilitated so that talented 
                                                 
24 Predictions are based respectively on Model 3 Table 2, Model 1 Table 4, and Model 2 Table 4. 
25 Predictions are based respectively on Model 3 Table 2 and Model 1 Table 4. 
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researchers have more equal access to the institutional capital of prestigious universities, or 
so that institutional capital at low-ranked universities is boosted. Our results suggest also that 
the number of researchers in the same workplace reduces exit at either entry or senior 
(associate and full professor) level. This effect is significant even after controlling for the size 
of university-level funding input, implying that social capital plays a pivotal role. 
Importantly, this effect is negligible in the pre-tenure term, suggesting that institutional social 
capital can help in the identification of entry positions for students, or may help in continuing 
academic research activities after tenure, but does not play a significant role at assistant 
professor level. 
Among geographical factors, employment opportunities related to teaching jobs at prefecture 
level facilitates the exit of assistant professors, suggesting academics’ move from research to 
teaching jobs within academia especially during the early phase of their career. 
Overall, these results imply that the selection process in Japan is based at least in part, on 
merit but might be compromised due to unfair selection or inequality between genders and 
among institutions, resulting in unintended exit. We also found some evidence that senior 
academics (associate and full professor) are more able to benefit from positive individual and 
institutional network effects. In other words, junior academics searching for tenured positions 
can be unreasonably forced to exit due to social network effects favoring senior academics. 
The network effect also extends to the senior academic’s students in relation to their first 
placements, implying that the social capital of senior academics can influence who joins 
academia. 
These findings should be interpreted with care. Due to the structure of the data, the 
destination of academics after leaving research is not completely clear. The study in this 
chapter assumes, based on Japanese mobility statistics, that most academics leaving research 
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become university teachers or administrators (rather than industry employees), or exit the 
labor force. However, the data might include different types of exit and also might include 
false exit (e.g., death, emigration). This study draws on a large sample in a first attempt to 
examine the main characteristics of exit from an academic research career. Future research 
should address the limitations outlined above by studying a smaller, more detailed sample 
(e.g., survey data). The specificity of our sample is also a limitation. Country and time 
specificities need to be considered because career progress is heavily dependent on the design 
of the academic system. Future research should examine exit from an academic research 
career in different national and historical contexts. 
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Appendix 1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation 
 
(A) Pre-employment Exit 
  Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. pre-employment dropout .59 .49 .00 1.00                   
2. graduation year 1987 1.41 1985 1989 .02                 
3. female .08 .27 .00 1.00 .08 .02               
4. top7 .38 .48 .00 1.00 -.15 -.03 -.02             
5. ln(#researcher) 4.19 1.04 .00 6.12 -.16 .01 -.03 .71           
6. field growth .14 .21 -.09 .54 -.02 -.77 -.02 .04 .02         
7. ln(#national univ employment) 7.84 .83 5.81 8.76 -.02 -.03 .01 .12 .16 .02       
8. ln(#private univ employment) 7.80 .91 5.06 8.92 -.07 -.03 -.01 .30 .36 .02 .79     
9. ln(#industrial employment) 7.75 2.22 .00 10.21 -.02 -.02 .00 .20 .23 .01 .87 .81   
10. ln(#PhD graduate) 5.28 1.33 .69 7.04 -.05 .05 .00 .29 .32 -.03 .83 .95 .88 
Notes: N = 13,776. For time-variant variables, we use the value of each variable at graduation year. 
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(B) Post-employment Exit 
 
  Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. post-employment dropout .03 .18 .00 1.00                                 
2. pub stock .27 7.16 -12.88 100.94 -.05                               
3. fund stock .50 7.76 -13.42 186.16 -.04 .67                             
4. female .05 .21 .00 1.00 .01 -.01 -.02                           
5. job tenure 7.88 6.47 1.00 77.00 .03 .04 .05 -.01                         
6. associate prof .65 .48 .00 1.00 .01 -.18 -.16 .04 -.40                       
7. full prof .24 .43 .00 1.00 -.01 .03 .03 -.03 .18 -.69                     
8. mobility 1.26 .79 .00 8.00 -.01 .13 .06 -.01 -.08 -.50 .26                   
9. ln(#cograntee) 1.38 1.16 .00 5.01 .01 .33 .35 -.02 .46 -.58 .30 .40                 
10. top7 .35 .48 .00 1.00 -.06 .12 .17 -.03 .05 .06 -.03 -.20 .06               
11. %univ fund 3.69 4.25 .00 26.48 -.06 .11 .18 -.01 .03 .09 -.05 -.21 .05 .72             
12. ln(#researcher) 3.79 1.24 .69 6.06 -.03 .10 .16 -.04 .13 .12 -.05 -.31 .06 .61 .67           
13. field growth .04 .11 -.20 .73 -.02 -.03 -.02 .01 -.29 .26 -.11 -.18 -.26 .02 .03 .06         
14. ln(#national univ employment) 7.81 .91 5.06 9.05 -.03 .06 .10 .00 .07 .04 -.03 -.11 .05 .32 .45 .32 -.01       
15. ln(#private univ employment) 7.82 2.08 .00 10.49 -.02 .04 .07 .00 .10 -.01 -.01 -.05 .07 .22 .36 .23 -.04 .83     
16. ln(#industrial employment) 7.75 .86 5.75 8.79 -.02 .02 .04 .01 .01 .07 -.04 -.09 -.02 .17 .30 .18 .00 .79 .88   
17. ln(#PhD graduate) 5.74 1.44 .69 8.17 -.01 .07 .11 .00 .27 -.12 .05 -.01 .20 .28 .39 .28 -.11 .92 .88 .81 
Notes: N = 93,474. 
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Appendix 2 Summary of Predictions by Career-Stage by Field 
 
 
(A) Pre-employment Exit 
 
    All fields Science Engineering Agriculture Pharmaceutical Medicine Dentistry 
Individual factors               
  graduation year             ++ 
  female +++ +++ + +++   +++   
Institutional factors               
  top7 ---   --- ---       
  ln(#researcher) --- - -     --- --- 
  field growth             ++ 
Geographical factors               
  ln(#national univ employment) ---         -   
  ln(#private univ employment) ++         +++ +++ 
  ln(#industrial employment)               
  ln(#PhD graduate) +       --   -- 
                  
Notes: +/- p<0.1; ++/-- p<0.05; +++/--- p<0. 01. 
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(B) Post-employment Exit 
 
    
All fields   
Math& 
Physics   Biology   Chemistry   Engineering  Agriculture   Pharmacy   
Basic 
Medicine   
Clinical 
Medicine   Dentistry 
    1 2   1 2   1 2   1 2   1 2   1 2   1 2   1 2   1 2   1 2 
Individual factors                                                           
  pub stock --- ---     ---     ---           --     -     -           -   -   
  fund stock - -           ++   +       --         +++ +     -   ---         
  female   -                       -   +     +                     
  job tenure --                                                     -- --- 
  full prof n.a. ---   n.a.     n.a. --   n.a. ---   n.a.     n.a.     n.a.     n.a.     n.a. ---   n.a. --- 
  mobility   ---                             -                     -- -- 
  ln(#cograntee) +++ ---     --     -                           ++ -   +++ --   +++   
Institutional factors                                                           
  top7 ---                             --       --         --     --   
  %univ fund --             +         +                             --   
  ln(#researcher) -- ---   --- ---     ---     -   --- ---     ---           --   -- ---       
  field growth --             +   ---                                       
Geographical factors                                                           
  ln(#national univ employment) --- ---   --     --     -- -   --- --     --   --     ---     --- ---   ---   
  ln(#private univ employment) +++                       --                       +++         
  ln(#industrial employment) --- ---   -       ---   --       ---   --           - ---   ---     ---   
  ln(#PhD graduate) +++ +++   ++     +       ++   +++ +++     +++   +++     +++     +++ ++   +++   
                                                              
Notes: +/- p<0.1; ++/-- p<0.05; +++/--- p<0. 01. Column 1 corresponds to pre-tenure exit and column 2 to post-tenure exit. 
 
